Corona as catalyst: ‘Glocal’ competition

Five centuries of Western dominance are now giving way to a new world order. Political, economic, military, cultural, and ideological structures are already being reshuffled. If the coronavirus spreads far enough, it will merely accelerate this transition. In this essay, I aim to briefly outline three of the major intersections shaping our time. Part 2: ‘Glocal’ competition / Part 1. Ideological / Part 3. Social

The world is in transition, first of all demanding ideological reflection within societies. But let us now consider this transition from an international perspective, because a second issue—already pressing—is becoming even more urgent: how important is national self-determination in a world that is increasingly interconnected and facing threats that demand international coordination?

Globalization is not new. For as long as we can remember, people have ventured ever farther from home in search of opportunity. History records a succession of winners and losers: those who benefit from other nations, and those who do not. Winners embrace the free movement of people, goods, and services; losers prefer to shut their borders. In past centuries, the West largely belonged to the winning side, asserting its right to free trade—even when selling, for example, opium to China. Today, we see the Chinese, Indians, Poles, and Mexicans seizing the opportunities of free movement, while the wealthiest parts of the West respond with slogans such as “America First” (Trump), “We Want Our Country Back” (UKIP), and “The Netherlands Is Ours” (Party for Freedom).

Behind this nostalgic nationalism and ironic protectionism lies a double motive: the West’s perceived loss of control threatens people not only economically but culturally. Chinese and Russian investors acquire Western companies and football clubs; Western mosques and Islamic schools are funded with Turkish and Arab money. Add the fear of Europe’s “Islamification,” and, in the Netherlands, the heated debate over Black Pete, and for many it is clear: it is not only Western economies but also Western culture that must be fiercely defended.

At the same time, something unprecedented is happening: never before has the entire world needed to collaborate to safeguard the planet. All nations face the same threats—climate change, nuclear risks, scarcity of water and raw materials, cyberattacks, refugee flows, human trafficking, and more. Each of these issues requires international coordination to be addressed effectively. No hacker, tsunami, or radioactive leak respects national borders, trade balances, or cultural heritage. In all these cases, nationalism alone is doomed to fail.

Now consider the pandemic unfolding amid this “glocal” competition. Here is another global challenge that binds nations together precisely as nationalism surges. Which way will the balance tip: toward international collaboration or national self-sufficiency? At present, we see both: countries confronting the same virus as if the rest of the world—or even the EU—did not exist, while scientists collaborate across continents to develop a vaccine.

This duality highlights an essential fact—one that shaped Europe’s history but is often forgotten in nationalist times: science and technology are never purely local affairs; they determine the fate of all humankind. Countries that isolate their scientific knowledge may protect a patent or two, but they forfeit the global potential of brainpower, expertise, and innovation.

And what of the economy? Will the pandemic push nations apart or bring them closer? History offers a lesson. During World War I, the sudden halt of global trade exposed nations’ vulnerabilities. Food shortages led to crises—including a national revolt in the Netherlands. After the war, many countries sought economic self-sufficiency (autarky). This strategy, however, created winners and losers. Some nations managed far better than others, and after a few decades, three proud nations—trapped by their own autarky policies and convinced of their entitlement—sparked World War II.

Today, we again witness the vulnerabilities of a globalized world: first physical, then economic. Disruptions in global trade are causing shortages, tempting politicians—especially in the West—to advocate economic self-sufficiency. In some cases, this makes sense: securing medical supplies, medicines, or reducing CO₂ emissions. But new self-sufficiency inevitably creates winners and losers. Famines and civil wars may follow when countries close their factories, and even less dramatic effects—for instance, reduced exports—can ripple outward.

This raises another question: when is it appropriate for a nation to defend its self-interest, and when does such defense backfire because cooperation and good relationships with other nations are essential?

The West is losing influence in the world. The United States and Great Britain, in particular, suffer from a “post-imperial stress disorder.” The world no longer aligns so neatly with Western interests, and some politicians interpret this as a license for unfettered national self-protection. The coronavirus may intensify this tendency, but the more inward-looking the West becomes, the more China—and soon India—will fill the leadership vacuum. Not only do these nations benefit from international partnerships, but many global challenges still demand cooperation. Countries can only achieve their goals if they can mobilize allies when decisions are made. China understands this and continues investing in relationships—even during the pandemic—while the West often weakens its old alliances.

The pandemic has made one reality undeniable: all nations share a single fate on one planet. As Westerners, we once held noble ideas about global responsibility. Let us hope we do not long forget why liberty, equality, and fraternity were cherished—not for one privileged nation, but for all of humankind.

Part 1. Ideological / Part 3. Social / BACK TO BLOGS

Corona as catalyst: Ideological competition

Five centuries of Western dominance are now giving way to a new world order. Political, economic, military, cultural, and ideological structures are already being reshuffled. If the coronavirus spreads far enough, it will merely accelerate this transition. In this essay, I aim to briefly outline three of the major intersections shaping our time. Part 1: Ideological competition / Part 2. ‘Glocal’ / Part 3. Social

Since 2006, Freedom House has reported a decline in freedom and democracy worldwide—that is, freedom and democracy as Westerners understand it. China plays a major legitimizing role in this trend. With its collectivist and paternalistic regime, it challenges the ideological benchmark of the West. No matter how much privacy, journalistic independence, or political participation is curtailed in Chinese society, no Western country is willing to pay the price of a direct confrontation. Too costly, too risky. Some banks are too big to fail; some countries are too big to franchise. A giant like China cannot be reshaped in the West’s image, and under Xi Jinping, it has abandoned any hesitation. China openly emphasizes the non-universal nature of Western democracy, and the West exposes its impotence by remaining silent.

At the same time, the failures of the “global democratic revolution” announced by Bush during the 2003 Iraq War, the continuous arms supplies from the ‘free world’ to autocratic regimes, and the exposure of Western hyper-liberalism during the financial crisis are all evident. And one group is keenly watching: the authoritarian leaders of the world. They interpret these developments as confirmation of their own ambitions.

Loss of economic power leads inevitably to a loss of ideological influence. Gradually, we are realizing the implications for the emerging world order. The “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” has become an alternative ideology alongside Western political thought. Every country is now forced to take a position. Neutrality is no longer an option. Each nation will occupy a place on a spectrum between Western individualism and Eastern collectivism, between American liberalism and Chinese socialism.

Even the West is beginning to feel drawn toward Eastern thinking. According to the OECD, by 2030, 60% of middle-class consumption will take place in Asia. Global products—movies, for example—will increasingly be tailored to Eastern cultural tastes. The West will not remain unaffected. And this is only the beginning of India’s rise. The more India asserts its independence from the US, the more its cultural and ideological influence will expand.

Now consider the pandemic amid this ideological competition. What captures our attention as we fight the virus: individual or collective interest? And which approach proves more effective: the individualistic West or the collectivist East? For authoritarian regimes, the crisis only reinforces confidence. The coronavirus has provided a perfect justification for submitting China’s 1.4 billion citizens even more fully to an omnipresent surveillance system.

The West, meanwhile, has suspended a dramatic range of freedoms to combat the virus. Citizens largely approve, trusting the measures are temporary. But how temporary is “temporary” if pandemics recur, and other dangers—climate change, cyber-attacks, nuclear risks, global terrorism—remain just as menacing? All these threats demand collective responses. Should we really restore all freedoms? Would it not be wise to adopt at least some of the digital technologies proving effective in Asia?

The coronavirus has intensified a question that has been pressing since China’s rise: how to strike the right balance between individual and collective interests, liberty and security. I expect Western countries to drift toward Eastern thinking. How far they move will depend on how convincingly they can articulate the value of individual liberty—and the responsibility it entails. Liberty requires less control, and less control entails risks. The more insecure our lives become, the greater our faith in freedom must be if we are not to surrender it in the name of security.

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Corona reveals the world’s peculiarities

A ghost is haunting the world – a virus that enters all nations into a holy alliance. Yet, no matter how much we fight the same enemy, our battle is as colorful as the nations. Whoever wishes to get to know the world can learn a lot these days. In response to the same virus all countries and leaders reveal their own peculiarities. Let me mention a few.

National personalities

  • In egalitarian countries, leaders are quick in calling upon their citizen’s responsible; in hierarchic countries, citizens are quick in holding their leaders responsible.
  • In democratic countries, leaders are checked for accuracy and honesty; in authoritarian countries, leaders tend to avoid criticism through concealment.
  • In more ‘reason oriented’ countries, leaders tend to consider a targeted lockdown to spare the economy and build immunity; in more ‘passion oriented’ countries, leaders tend to reject this as cold and calculated and advocate for a total lockdown.

International reflexes

  • In the United States, we hear Trump speak of the “Chinese virus”; in Russia, we hear people speak of an American bioweapon.
  • In Africa, people suspect the West of using Africans as guinea pigs in the development of a vaccine.
  • In the European Union, old accusations between north and south come to light as soon as financial support is discussed.

Ideological priorities

  • While the US president makes every effort to protect the economy (leading to measures that are long overdue), the Chinese president makes every effort to secure the well-being of its citizens (leading to an even greater state control).
  • While the one European leader calls upon everyone’s sense of public responsibility, the other seizes the moment to rule by decree.

Seen in this light, this corona time is not exactly a revolutionary time. Rather, it is one big affirmation of the status quo. Still, many people state that the world will not be the same after corona. Are they right? I think they are. But let’s not forget that the world was changing already and will change anyway. In the next blogs I will explain why.

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A one-hour overview of major positive and negative trends in today’s world

If you have a spare hour, enjoy the video below in which I take you around the globe, summarizing the major positive and negative trends in today’s world. In 2018, I held this lecture for senior leaders of major corporations in Sydney and Melbourne (companies like Perpetual Limited, QBE, Deloitte, Karrikins Group, Oxford University Press, Worley Parsons and Pearson) in my role as Chief of Vision within World Vision Australia. This video was recorded by QBE in Sydney.

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Europe has a simple choice: be the world’s 4th giant or a bunch of glorious dwarfs

If the GDP projections of PwC are correct, not a single European country will sit at the table when the G8 gathers in 2050. Germany can still join the G8 in 2030, but not the country that is currently most absorbed by defending its sovereignty: the United Kingdom.

Source: PwC (2017)

Of course, projections like these should be taken with a substantial grain of salt. But it sends a crystal clear message to Europe: now is the time to make up your mind! What do you really want? Be the 4th giant in the world – next to China, India and the US – or settle for glorious dwarfness by prioritizing national sovereignty over European unity?

Economically, the EU is already a giant. It is the world’s second-largest economy by GDP. But as long as the EU doesn’t grow up as a political entity (with one democratically chosen leader speaking on behalf of all EU members and citizens), we will continue to see a mind-boggling contradiction t between the EU’s strength as economic power and weakness as political leader, illustrated by the survey below:

Source: Pew Research Center (2017)

Below PwC’s ranking of the top-32 economies in 2016, 2030 en 2050. Europe is rapidly losing ground in the market place. Time to make up its mind. The current EU-approach is neither fish nor fowl, with for example a G20 containing both leaders of individual EU-countries and a representative of the EU. The more the rankings below become a reality, the more European countries will have to decide: splendid isolation as sovereign nations or significant participation as united EU.

Source: PwC (2017)

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18 of the last 20 centuries China and India were the biggest economies

Source: Michael Cembalest, Angus Maddison (2008), updated by Visual Capitalist

A quick look at the above chart and you may be surprised to see that China and India were by far the biggest economies in the first 18 of the last 20 centuries. Sure, it is all based on estimations and using different time intervals on the x-axis is actually not done. But nevertheless, we can draw some valuable insights from this chart.

Until 1800, economic progress was largely linear and linked to population growth. The more people, the bigger the share of GDP in the global economy. Hence the leading position of China and India. Already 2000 years ago, 60% of the world’s population lived in these two countries (thanks to a growing amount of tea, cotton and rice).

Source: Derek Thompson (2012)

But then the Industrial Revolution changed the game altogether: suddenly, productivity started determining a country’s share of GDP in the world’s economy. Europe and the United States could produce way more wealth with their factories than the size of their population would indicate. It gave them a head start in economic power, which they unashamedly translated into military power. China and India faced severe humiliations from the West in the last 2 centuries.

But things are changing dramatically again. China and India are catching up, with China behaving like a petrol engine and India like a diesel engine (needing more time to warm up). The leverage of the West is diminishing, their head start disappearing. And this time, China and India can combine their industrial power with their immense population. Once both countries are ‘up to date’ and ‘up to scale’, their huge work force and internal market will allow them to go above and beyond. China may have reached this point already, India is on its way.

Once all of the catching up is done, we will see an economic world order that shouldn’t surprise anyone: a world order that existed already for 18 of the last 20 centuries and only got disrupted for 200 years.

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Why tomorrow will be less democratic than today

Western-style democracy, emphasizing individual freedoms and rights, is under global pressure and facing decline even in the West. Here are five reasons why.

1. China gets away with an authoritarian approach
Some banks are “too big to fail”, some countries are “too big to franchise”. There is no way Western democracies can shape China in their own image. It is also clear by now that they are not willing to sacrifice political and economic relations with China in exchange for upholding a Western view on democracy and human rights. So, get used to a world where superpowers can be openly undemocratic (according to Western standards) and get away with it. And don’t forget how inspiring it can be for other regimes, and how much it can add legitimacy to their own authoritarian ambitions, to see China ‘win’ with an authoritarian approach.

(Russia is a different and more complicated story, due to its strong army and vulnerable economy. Its military strength demands caution in the West; its economic needs provide opportunities for the West.)

2. Western-style democracy does not seem the ultimate solution any longer
Western-style democracy is a tough seed to sow: in most countries where it was recently introduced, it failed. Democracy is a vulnerable system as it requires discussions among equals and does not stop the election of undemocratic people and parties. Whatever its value, recent history has made it much easier for opponents to dismiss it as a universal solution. In October 2014, an influential journal of the Chinese Communist Party (Qiushi) made the following statement with reference to the enduring violence and turmoil in countries like Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq and Libya:

The West always brags that its own democracy is a ‘universal value’ and denies there is any other form of democracy… Western democracy has innate internal flaws and certainly is not a ‘universal value’; its blind copying can only lead to disaster.

The days are over when the West could suffice with simply supposing the superior nature and universal resolving power of its democracy.

3. Secular societies lack the resilience to withstand their need for security
More freedom means less security, more security means less freedom. A well-known dilemma in democracies, leading to the question: what will democracies need more in the coming years, security or freedom? The answer is clearly security, for two reasons: 1) the growing amount of threats within and around democracies, making citizens feel more vulnerable, 2) a lack of resilience in democracies to accept risks.

Ad 2) The Democracy Index of The Economist Intelligence Unit shows that the most democratic countries also happen to be the most secular countries in the world. This combination seems to have a price: the less people can surrender to Someone or Something that controls the universe – a God (Jews, Muslims, Christians), Spirit or Life Force (Taoists, Buddhists, New Agers), Social Order (Confucianists, Socialists) – the more difficult it becomes to accept adversities and risks in life. Friends and family can compensate to some extent, but solitude is a major problem in secular societies and only some problems can be fixed by others. So, what we see in secular societies is a lack of resilience: people can be the happiest in the world when their life is in order, but easily get anxious or depressed when things get out of hand. There is little tolerance for anything that threatens the good life. Combine this with the growing threats in the world and we may see a growing willingness in precisely the most democratic countries, to sacrifice freedoms in exchange for more security.

Big question: where will this process end? How much loss of freedom does it take before people start to accept insecurities in exchange for freedom?

4. World issues cannot be solved in a tolerant way
Pandemics, climate change, cyber crime, international crime, global terrorism, nuclear risks – the dangers these issues contain can only be tackled if all countries cooperate. Leave one out, and hackers, criminal organizations and terrorists will pick that country as their hiding place. And so, the more urgent these issues become, the less countries will be patient with those that obstruct the process. World issues, by their nature, don’t care about the sovereignty of states, and so will powerful states when facing a clear and present danger. Authoritarianism will take over, a less democratic world order appear.

5. Democracies cannot be defended in a democratic way
Another notorious dilemma: democratic tolerance can only be defended in an intolerant way. We simply cannot differ about the democratic space to differ. Democratic rules ensure freedom, but only if everyone submits to them. This raises the question: do democracies need to be more intolerant in the coming years, to ensure a fee and open society? The current rise of oppressive groups, in and around democracies, clearly points towards a yes. And so, expect to see more ‘inevitable intolerance’ coming from democracies as a matter of self preservation. Democratic governments will have to be specific about the rules of an open and free society, and they will have to enforce these rules where needed. A process as unavoidable as it is tricky, because of the continuous risk that democracies become too specific about the rules and a source of oppression in their fight for freedom.

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